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PREFACE 
This document is based on the doctoral dissertation of Benedict D .  C. Wong and 
is the final report for Project No. G84007. This project was conducted by Benedict D .  C.  
Wong and J. Wayland Eheart and was supported by the Water Resources Center of the 
University of Illinois. 
In an earlier effort the same investigators, in collaboration with Randolph M .  
Lyon and Angela E. Libby, studied alternative structures for water rights markets. Dur- 
ing the course of that investigation it became apparent that pre-existing water rights 
markets might provide better information on the benefits to be derived from reservoirs 
and other water development projects than currently practiced benefitrcost analysis. 
Moreover, it was felt that greater social benefit might accrue with an integrated system 
of water rights and water development projects. This led to the present project, which is 
a study to develop and assess alternative means of ~ t~ruc tu r ing  such integrated systems. 
I t  draws upon previously developed analytical techniques and develops new techniques 
to simulate and evaluate the operations of these systems. It includes qualitative discus- 
sions of several of the issues attending the promulgation of such systems and compares 
several alternative institutional arrangements. 
This report should be valuable to professionals in regulatory agencies who are 
interested in applying economic incentives to the management of water resources. I t  
should also be of use to those concerned with examining alternative policies for regulatc 
ing stream withdrawals. 
J. Wayland Ehea.rt 
December, 1985 
The needs and the approaches for developing ( 1 )  efficient methods for the allo- 
cation of water resources and ( 2 )  efficient planning tools for the design and operation of 
storage facilities and other water supply enhancement techniques, are often interrelated, 
and should be addressed in a coordinated fashion. Recent studies have shown that the 
marketable water permits system holds some attractive features as a vechicle for allocab 
ing water supplies. In this study, management techniques to integrate marketable water 
rights systems with systems for the design and operation of a single reservoir are 
developed. Three kinds of rights may be found in such integrated systems. They are 
natural flowing water rights, release rights, and storage rights, which are contingent on 
possession of  permits. Auctions of these rights o r  other market  transactions may be 
helpful to the design and operation of the reservoir by providing useful information 
about the users' demand and benefit functions. In order to assess the efficiency of these 
policies, their operations are simulated using economic data based on corn irrigation. 
These programs are then compared to some other methods of water allocation and 
reservoir operation. Results of the study show that high efficiency may be attained by 
these integrated systems. As in many other water resources and reservoir management 
systems, the efficiencies attained are, in part, dependent on how well the future is 
predicted. A highly sophisticated storage management policy is likely to generate higher 
efficiency than simple ones, but  only if the release decisions are carefully determined. 
Restrictions on spot trading would also prevent some of the efficiency from being cap- 
tured. When the integrated system is operated and managed by a profitseeking private 
enterprise, some degree of supervision from the authority may be required to prevent 
the problem of supply curtailment (i.e., undersizing of the reservoir), caused by a 
potentially larger profit at a smaller reservoir size. 
We would like to thank Dr.  E. Downey Brill, Jr., Dr.  Jon C. Liebman and Dr.  
Judith S. Liebma,n for their comments. 
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NOTATION AND LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Each symbol is defined when it first appears in the text; however, for conveni- 
ence of reference they are also described here. Subscripts are used to indicate position 
in a sequence, set, matrix, etc. Superscripts of nonnumerical values are used as general 
distinguishing marks and are part of the associated symbols. 
amount of water applied; 
binary variable (0 or 1) designating the exclusion or inclusion of the fixed 
cost for user u;  
user u's water use benefit at time t; 
cost of reservoir; 
user u's fixed cost; 
user u's variable cost at time f ;  
amount of water applied by user u at time t; 
user u's maximum demand for water at time t; 
user u's minimum demand for water at time t; 
user u's marginal value of water use at time t; 
user u's expected marginal value of water use at time t; 
marginal value function of storage at time t ;  
marginal value of storage at period p; 
marginal value function of water use at time t ;  
user u's fractional water right; 
cost factor at time t; 
cost adjusting factor; 
user u 's  fractional storage defined in terms of the maximum resewoir 
capacity; 
user u's fractional storage defined in terms of the maximum available 
reservoir capacity; 
inflow to the reservoir at time t; 
user u's inflow at time t; 
land cost; 
evaporative, seepage and other losses from the reservoir at time t; 
user u's evaporative, seepage and other losses from the reservoir a t  time t; 
a number at least as large as the maximum value of C DU,,; 
tE T 
number of periodic cycle; 
number of time periods in a periodic time cycle; 
outflow from the reservoir at time t; 
amount of water allocated to user u at time t; 
user u's outflow from the reservoir at time t; 
user u's priority of receiving (release o r  natural flowing) water allocation; 
amount of storage; 
user u's size of (release or  natural flowing) water rights; 
target storage for period p; 
intended storage at  time t ;  
intended water use at  time t; 
set of all time (periods); 
time index; 
set of a particular period in every cycle; 
subset of time (periods), To T; 
set of all prospective water users; 
user index; 
set  of water users whose marginal values of water use are higher than the 
marginal value of storage for week t ;  
set  of water users who have a higher priority of receiving (release or  
natural flowing) water allocation than user u; 
size of reservoir; 
storage at  time t; 
user u's storage at time t; 
storage space reserved for other uses; 
storage space reserved for other uses at time t; 
capacity (size) of reservoir; 
user u's maximum storage capacity (size); 
user u's minimum storage capacity (size); 
minimum storage required at time t; 
(given) storage at time t; 
(given) user u's storage at time t; 
user u's value of water use at time 1 ,  Wu,t=Bu,t  - cZ t ;  
economic value function of storage at time p ;  and 
Z aggregate net benefit. 
Abbreviotiona: 
FFR fractional flow right; 
LDR Linear decision rule; 
PSUR prioritized steady use right; 
Scenorioa: 
OptIS 
OptNM .RR-PSUR 
OptNM .SR-PSUR 
OptNM .SR-FFR 
OptSpo t 
EMVU 
Optimal Integrated Marketable Water Rights and Reservoir Sys- 
tem 
Practicable Program Using Linear Decision Rules 
Practicable Program Based on the Marginal Values of Storage 
and Water Use 
Optimal Nonmarke t System with Prioritized Release Rights 
Optimal Nonmarket System with Separate Prioritized Flow 
Rights and Fractional Storage Rights 
Optimal Nonmarket System with Separate Fractional Flow and 
Fractional Storage Rights 
Optimal Integrated System with Spot Rights Only 
Scenario with Uncertainties in Predicting the Marginal Values of 
Water Use Only 
Population growth and expansion in agricultural and industrial uses, coupled 
with the recent intensive energy developments in the United States, have led to an 
increasing stress on our water resources [U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of 
Reclamation, 1975; U.S. Water Resources Council, 1978; Council on Environmental 
Quality and U.S. Department of State, 1980; Pimentel et al., 19821. Although it is gen- 
erally accepted by hydrologists and others (see, e.g., Piper (19651 and Nace [1967]) that 
there is an ample supply of water from both surface and ground sources nationally to 
satisfy all needs, regional water problems do occur due to uneven spatial and temporal 
distributions of precipitation and/or inadequate planning, management and develop- 
ment. Water shortages can occur anywhere in the nation at any time (see, e.g., Russell 
et al. [1970], Berk et al. [1981], Sheer [I9801 and Tuvel [1981]), but mostly in the 
semiarid or  arid West. The U.S. Water Resources Council [I9781 has identified local- 
ized surface water problems in all 21 water resources regions, and moderate to severe 
ground water overdrafts in some 38 (ou t  of 106) subregions, particularly in the High 
Plains area extending from Texas to Nebraska, in south-central Arizona and in parts of 
California. Thus water supply will continue to be a problem unless alternatives are seri- 
ously considered. 
There are many ways to cope with the shortage problem (see, e.g., U.S. National 
Water Commission [1973], Holtz and Sebastian [1978], U.S. Water Resources Council 
[1978], Cameron and Armstrong [1979], Howe et al. [I9821 and Mather [1984]),  and 
they can be classified into three general categories: 
1 )  Increasing supply-Water supply can be augmented by developing new or 
alternative sources such as water reclamation, tapping of untapped wells o r  aquifers, 
water desalination, modification of the hydrologic cycle. However, at the present time 
most of these methods are usually costly (e.g., desalination), with uncertain results 
(e.g., weather modification) or with environmental safety concerns (e.g., waste-water 
reuse). 
2) Reducing demand-Demand for water can be reduced by controlling popula- 
tion growth, increasing water-use efficiency by introducing new technology (such as 
switching to drip irrigation), substituting other product inputs for water through 
economic incentives, and by conservation practices, etc. 
3) Improved water resources planning, development and m a n a g e m e n t  
Continuous and effective water programs are essential to resolving our water shortage 
problems. Water supply can be improved by integrating surface and ground water plan- 
ning and management programs, developing policies to allocate or  reallocate water more 
efficiently and effectively, transferring water over time and space through storage and 
transportation facilities, etc. Marketable water rights systems and the systems of storage 
design and operation, which are the subjects of investigation in this study, belong to this 
category. 
In arriving at the solution of our water shortage problem via these means, espe- 
cially those in the third category, conflicts among users seem to be inevitable in many 
instances. Conflicts among users of shared resources (including water) due to increasing 
competition of use, in general, are resolved through historical, social, judicial, legislative 
and economic institutions [Church, 19821. For a number of political, legal, social, cul- 
tural and technical reasons [James, 1974; Nanda, 19771, the role of the marketplace for 
property rights in water has largely been ignored historically, and water rights are seldom 
treated as economic goods. Only within the last three decades have economists and oth- 
ers (see, e.g., Ciriacy-Wantrup [1956], Milliman [1959], Gaff ney [1962], Trelease 
[1965], Ellis [1966], Hirshleifer et 01. [1969], Hartman and Seastone [1970], Johnson 
[1971], Meyers and Posner [1971], Null [1974], Tregarthen [1977], Ausness [1977-781, 
Oeltjen and Fischer [1978], Phelps et 01. [1978a, 1978b], Burness and Quirk [1977, 
1979, 1980a, 1980b], Bagley et 01. [1980], Johnson et 01. [1981], Randall [1981], Libby 
[1982], Brown et 01. [1982], Fractor [1982], Eheart and Lyon [1983], Wong and Eheart 
[1983], Anderson [1983a] and Gisser [1983]) suggested the possibility of using the 
market mechanism as a means of allocating o r  reallocating the property rights in watyr 
among users. Despite the fact that most of the works in marketable water rights sys- 
tems are on the theoretical aspects of analysis or based on semi-hypothetical case stu- 
dies, in practice marketable water rights systems could be an attractive alternative for 
water allocation or reallocation. As a matter of fact, because of few institutional restric- 
tions on the transfer of ownership of water property, permanent as well as seasonal 
transfers of water rights are commonplace in Utah [Bagley et al., 19801 and in the 
western part of South Platte Basin [Brown et al., 19821. 
In 1978 former President Carter [I9781 issued the Water Policy Initiatives 
directed towards improving our national water policy. One of the four main objectives 
of the Initiatiuea was to establish water conservation as a national priority. However, 
this document has been criticized (see, e.g., American Society of Civil Engineers, 
National Water Policy Committee [1979]) in that water conservation was not well- 
defined in the context used and that economic efficiency was not a decision criterion for 
water conservation. Furthermore, it appears that the provision of storage was not  
included in the definition of conservation, but  rather as a component in project evalu* 
tion. There have been many discussions about the precise definition of water conserv* 
tion throughout history [Baumann et of., 19841. Whether regulatory storage reservoirs 
should be included in the definition does not really matter in this study. What is impor- 
tant is the fact that traditionally, in the United States as well as in many other parts of 
the world, structural measures such as reservoirs o r  dams are often used to regulate 
flow patterns o r  impound natural flowing water so that water can be utilized to a greater 
extent. For example, annually a substantial amount of water (approximately 220 billion 
cubic meters, 13%of total river flow [Langbein, 19591) has been made available through 
reservoir storage developments in the U.S. (mainly through projects initiated by the 
Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation) and over 22 billion cubic meters of 
storage is provided by a total of more than two and a half million farm ponds [Henry 
and Gambell, 19811. 
The importance of the interrelation between water allocation/reallocation policy 
and reservoir design and operation in an effective and efficient water management pro- 
gram has long been recognized. Most of the studies and analyses related to marketable 
water rights systems (as an alternative water allocation/reallocation policy) are concen- 
trated on unregulated (uncontrolled) watercourses, and little attention has been given to 
the situation when storage facilities are present o r  anticipated. In this study, planning 
tools for reservoir and water management are developed by integrating marketable water 
rights systems with systems of reservoir design and operation. This study focuses on 
the economic efficiency of the management strategies for a single reservoir system. 
In earlier discussions, it was pointed out that marketable water rights systems 
have great potential as an alternative policy for the allocation/reallocation of water sup- 
plies. Furthermore, storage and regulating reservoirs play an important role in augmenb 
ing natural streamflow to meet the contingency of shortages. In view of these con- 
siderations, this study has been undertaken to develop and evaluate strategies or policies 
for the integration of systems of marketable water rights and reservoir design and opera- 
tion, which could be used to enhance planning and management of our  water resources. 
Such integrated systems have the advantage, a t  least conceptually, of generating real 
benefit data from the market  information, rather than engineering estimates usually 
used in benefi tcost  studies. 
The specific objectives of the study are: 
1. To develop integrated systems of marketable water rights and reservoir 
design and operation, and 
2. To evaluate these alternative policies with regard to some measures of 
effectiveness (primarily economic efficiency). 
Although most  of the discussions in this study refer to single reservoir systems, 
in general the approaches for integrating systems of marketable water rights and reser- 
voir design and operation examined here could be applied to multiple reservoir systems 
as well. 
1.2 RELEVANCE OF RESEARCH 
This study will contribute to the development of joint systems of storage and 
marketable water permits as a management strategy for the allocation/reallocation of 
water resources. The results of this study may be useful to federal agencies, regional, 
state and local administrative/regulatory a~ thor i t i e s  in planning and managing existing 
and future water policies. Furthermore, individual water users may find the study help- 
ful in making capital investment decisions and bid preparations in an integrated water 
rights and storage market  system (which may emerge in a variety of forms in the . 
future). 
This report is divided into six sections. Section 2 contains a general description 
and an overview of marketable water rights system and the system for the design and 
operation of a single reservoir. In Section 3, combined treatment of the water rights 
markets and reservoir design and operation is discussed. To study the effect of system 
constraints and uncertainties of future events on the performance of the integrated sys- 
tems, a number of scenarios are devised. These scenarios are developed and formulated 
in Section 4. Application of these systems to a partly hypothetical and partly empirical 
data base is described in Section 5. Finally, conclusions from this study are presented in 
the last section. 
2. AN OVERVIEW OF MMUGCTABLE WATER R.IGH'IS 
SYSTEMS AND THE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF 
SINGLERJ3SERVOIR SYSTEMS 
As pointed out  in the first section, the overall objective of this study is to 
develop techniques of integrating marketable water rights systems with systems of reser- 
voir design and operation. Before going into the details of these joint systems, the two 
systems to be considered are examined separately in the following two subsections. 
2.1 AN -VIEW OF SYS'IEMS OF -LE WATER RIGHTS 
Ciriacy-Wantrup [I9561 has been credited as the first investigator to examine the 
use of security and flexibility of water rights as economic criteria in a water rights sys- 
tem. Since then, a number of studies have appeared in the literature on the treatment 
of water rights as real property rights approximating other commodities. 
H irshleifer et ol. [I9691 discussed in depth various economic and technological 
aspects of water policy. They stated that they tried to effect a major change in the prac- 
tice and thought on water-supply problems. The possibility of improving the efficiency 
of water use by the process of market allocation was analyzed. Water allocation practices 
have changed somewhat in the last twenty years, but only to a minor extent. 
After analyzing the problem of water crises and the economic, legal, political and 
administrative aspects of existing water policy, Anderson [ 1983al and Rogers [ 1983) 
concluded that the scarcity of water is the result of institutional constraints and political 
wills. Similar conclusions were also expressed by Weatherford [I9821 and Anderson 
[:L983b]. Anderson [1983a] further explored the potential of a private market in water 
rights for resolving our  institutional water crisis. 
Milliman 119591, Trelease [1965], Johnson [1971], Meyers and Posner [1971], 
Null [1974], Ausness [1977-78) and Oeltjen and Fischer [I9781 examined the legal, 
institutional and economic aspects of water laws and policies, and discussed the interre- 
lations of property rights to water, economic forces and public regulations. 
Trelease [1965], Tregarthen [I9771 and Ausness [1977-781 pointed ou t  and sum- 
marized the difficulties and possible failure in water rights markets. Two of the most 
important obstacles to development of a marketable water rights system are the lack of 
appropriate and well-defined property rights to water and the possible restrictions on 
their transfer. These two problems, though, are not unrelated. 
Hartman and Seastone [I9701 studied the issue of transferability on the 
efficiency of market  allocation. They concluded that existing restrictions on transfer for 
the protection of third party users are responsible for the suboptimal nature of allocation 
because compensation from third party gainers (positive externalities) is not  accounted 
for. A similar result was recognized under the doctrine of prior appropriation by Bur- 
ness and Quirk [1980a]. Furthermore, Burness and Quirk [1979, 1980a, 1980bl con- 
cluded that additional inefficiencies are generated as a result of unequal sharing of risk 
among appropriators. On the other hand, Johnson et al. [I9811 argued that it is not  the 
appropriative system, but  the definition of water rights which leads to inefficient transfer 
of water. 
Gaffney [1962] suggested a system of frequent auctions for the determination of 
water delivery schedule. Phelps et al. [1978a, 1978bl proposed a system of long-term 
transferable water entitlements under which exchanges of water both within and 
between water districts require the authority's approval. However, they stated that 
transfer should be allowed whenever possible. After examining some reform proposals 
in the American literature, relevant economic theory and the local situation, Randall 
[1981] proposed a system of transferable water entitlement for the water economy in 
Australia, which would encourage reallocation of existing water supplies and eliminate 
the creation of new subsidized irrigation projects. He concluded that such a system is 
likely to generate political support and less opposition. 
Bagley et al. [1980] studied the potential for initiating and operating a water 
bankinglbrokering service in Utah. Permanent and temporary transfer of long- and 
s h o r t t e r m  water rights may be done through such centralized and formalized organiza- 
tions. They concluded that this kind of service could be an effective and efficient means 
for water reallocation and that there are no major constitutional, statutory, o r  regulatory 
hindrances in the operation of such a system. 
Eheart and Lyon [I9831 identified and compared alternative designs of market- 
able water permits systems qualitatively. They proposed a two-stage market for water 
rights. In the first stage, the base (rights) market, rights of relatively long ( b u t  not  
necessary the same) duration are allocated with the intention of providing the users 
with some medium- to long-term planning horizon. Since most  water uses involve 
costly facilities or  equipment, the long effective periods of the permits would provide the 
users a basis for decision on capital investment. In the subsequent spot market  stage, 
rights of relatively shor t  duration would be traded among users o r  prospective users just 
prior to use. Active spot trading is important in that future events cannot be predicted 
with certainty, and through such transactions economic efficiency that  is no t  captured in 
the base market  might be recaptured. Periodic trading in the spot market  within the 
market  region could be done in an informal o r  formal environment. A water 
bankinglbrokering service [Bagley et al., 19801 which provides different (from limited to 
extensive) levels of service would be very helpful in the exchange of water rights in the 
spot market and to a certain extent  in the acquisition of rights in the base market. 
With the exception of the study by Wong and Eheart  [1983], most  of the other 
studies on  marketable water rights did n o t  look into the detailed practical applications of 
these systems. Wong and Eheart [I9831 applied these systems as well as other non- 
market programs to a partly hypothetical and partly empirical data s e t  based on  irrigation 
water use. Their simulation results indicated that  higher economic efficiency is obtained 
for  the market  systems than for the nonmarket  policies. Inefficiency of a particular sys- 
tem o r  program, in general, could be caused by: ( I )  the presence of system constraints 
such as the definition of rights and the rights allocation procedures, and ( 2 )  the uncer- 
tainties of future events. Results of the study by Wong and Eheart [I9831 suggested 
that  the efficiency loss in the market  systems is attributed more to the restrictions 
imposed by the design of the system than to the users' inability to predict future physi- 
cal events. 
Although there have been many studies of marketable water rights systems, 
most  of them deal only with unregulated (uncontrolled) watercourses. Ciriacy-Wantrup 
[I9561 discussed the implications and difficulties of storing water through physical means 
with a view of reducing physical uncertainty under either the appropriative o r  riparian 
doctrine. Burness and Quirk [1977, 1980bl considered and analyzed the optimal opera- 
tion of an upstream storage facility and its implication for the efficiency aspects of the 
appropriative as well as the correlative doctrines. They assumed identical users with the 
same production (revenue generation) function-the only difference being their relative 
locations along the watercourse-and concluded that  inefficiencies could also arise from 
subdptimal storage policies in addition to the restrictions on  transfer. 
2.2 AN OVERVIEW OF RESERVOIR PLANNING AND W A -  
Ever since the dawn of history men have learned to make use of water storage 
and regulating facilities. Dams and reservoirs are built to store water for future use, to 
regulate streamflow for navigation and transportation purposes, for preserving life in the 
stream, for recreational purposes and so on.  In this study, the use of storage facilities 
primarily for  increasing the efficiency of use in a water rights market system is exam- 
ined; i.e., reservoirs are used to store water to be used in the future. The term reser- 
voir is used loosely here to include any traditional means of artifical or natural storage 
from which releases may be controlled. 
Under current water rights law, individual storage of water for future use via 
physical means can only be done with the approval of the water administrative authority, 
with the exception of reasonable use under the riparian rights doctrine (see, e.g., Malo- 
ney [1962] and Shannonhouse [1962]). However, in a marketable water rights system, 
no such approval is needed for small off-stream reservoirs since an individual water 
rights owner has exclusive right to his water property. For dams and reservoirs which 
also control downstream water releases, some degree of supervision from the water 
administrative authority may be required to guarantee that third party rights are not  
injured. 
The intended use of reservoirs in this study is for resolving the shortage prob- 
lem rather than for the purpose of flood control. Nevertheless, that use, especially of 
large reservoirs, may create problems when natural flow increases drastically, as during 
heavy rainstorms. Davis 119781 discussed the duties and rights of operators of water 
retention structures in dealing with excess flows. In his paper, he examined the situ* 
tion of negligent reservoir operation causing damages to downstream users. This issue 
is recognized but is not the primary concern here. Other societal o r  environmental 
impacts as a result of these structural measures [Darnell, 1976; Baxter, 1977; Ward and 
Stanford, 1979; Black, 1981; Margheh  and Safley, 1981; Biswas, 1983; Napier et al., 
19851 might be important and should be carefully studied before construction takes 
place, but are not  considered in this study. 
Determining the ways of accomplishing the objective of economic gain via physi- 
cal measures could be the responsibility or  obligation of the individual users o r  the 
authority. In a community of more than one water user, some users may want to build 
reservoirs of their own, or  they may want to have a larger reservoir so that its functions 
or  uses are shared by a majority of, if not  all, people in the region of concern. A large 
reservoir is usually preferred to individual reservoirs for reasons of economies of scale. 
Of course, the use of both large and small reservoirs by the water users or the 
authority is possible, especially when the releases from the large reservoir are deter- 
mined by the authority instead of the individuals and no rental o r  ownership of storage 
in the large reservoir is available. In such a case, there exists the possibility of subop- 
timal releases by the authority, possibly due to imperfect information about the users' 
cost and benefit functions. Thus, the use of individually managed reservoirs in addition 
to the large ones may further increase the efficiency of the system. Other reasons for 
the use of individual reservoirs o r  for the conjunctive use of both types of reservoirs 
might be the prior existence of such small reservoirs, diseconomy of scale, the lack of 
potential sites for a large reservoir and the preferences of some users. 
The availability and location of suitable reservoir sites and the preexistent water 
rights situation in the region are two inherent problems of implementing and integrating 
marketable water rights systems with reservoir systems. Since potential sites for reser- 
voirs depend on the geological and hydrologic configuration of the region, it is possible 
that no suitable site could be found even though the productivity and profitability of the 
users in the area would be expected to increase from its use. When a potential site is 
available, the owner of the land may have monopolistic power over its use, which is an 
obstacle to the competitive market. Thus, some kind of governmental control might be 
required in these cases. Furthermore, the usefulness of the reservoir might also be res- 
tricted by the limitations on capacity imposed by the physical characteristics of the dam 
site. 
As pointed out  by Ciriacy-Wantrup (19561, differences in preexistent water 
rights between individual water users o r  between geographically closely related regions 
may obstruct o r  retard construction and coordinated management of storage. Users 
whose existent rights are more secure against uncertainty due to variability of physical 
events (senior appropriative rights holders, for example) may be reluctant to join those 
whose rights are less secure, depending on the economic implications of such a change. 
The economic consequence is related to a number of factors such as the size of reser- 
voir chosen, the way the storage is managed, the costs incurred by each user and the 
degree of uncertainties that could be reduced. 
The sizing and operation of reservoir systems plays an important role in the con- 
junctive management of water rights and reservoir systems. Options for integrating 
these two systems are discussed in the next section. 
3. JOINT SYSTEMS OF lKWKETABLE WATER R.IGHIS 
AND RESERVOIR DESIGN AM) O P E W O N  
3.1 OPnONS FOR INTEGRA'IlNG SYSTEMS OF m E  WATER 
RIGHTS AND RESERVOIR DESIGN AND OPERA'IlON 
There are multitudes of ways of managing a reservoir in conjunction with a 
water rights market. A number of approaches for integrating systems of marketable 
water rights and reservoir design and operation are examined here. Under these poli- 
cies, each user acquires rights from the authority. These rights could be exercised upon 
possession, of  permits, possibly for different durations (effective periods). Unless other- 
wise stated, exchanges of s h o r t  o r  long-term permits, if available, among users and the 
authority are usually unrestricted. The organization or  agency which has control over 
the operation of the entire integrated system may be some water administrative author- 
ity (water-master) such as the State Engineer in some States, or a utility or  utilities 
regulated by such an agency. 
Operating policies for the integrated systems may be classified according to the 
types of rights or economic commodities involved. These policies are described as fol- 
lows: 
1. Management of aeparate flow righta and atorage righta: Under this policy, both 
flow rights and storage rights are treated as economic commodities initially 
supplied by the government and/or other entity which assumes original 
ownership of water rights and/or the reservoir (storage facilities). The term 
flow rights, natural flowing water rights, unregulated water rights o r  uncon- 
trolled water rights refers to the rights to water before passing through the 
reservoir in the region of concern, which may be the natural flowing water, 
regulated water or released water from an upstream region. An individual 
storage right is much like an individually owned small reservoir. I t  is the 
right to store water in the reservoir. Individual users and/or the authority 
may own either or both types of rights. Exchanges of both long- and 
short term (i.e., just prior to use) flow and storage rights among users 
and/or the authority are allowed whenever possible. Those who own 
storage rights have full control over the storing of water in and releasing of 
water from their storage allocations. Refilling allocations are equal to the 
amount of water to which the users are entitled, limited by their available 
storages. The reservoir operator releases water in accordance with requests 
from individual users. The requests for storage management may be done 
routinely; e.g., a user may initially specify a rule of release to be followed by 
the reservoir operator until further notice. 
2.  Management  of releaae righta: Under this policy, there are no separate flow 
rights and reservoir storage rights. Instead, outflow released from the regu- 
lating reservoir is the sole commodity. The authority is assumed to be in 
command of the natural flowing water. Furthermore, the reservoir in its 
entirety is owned by the authority and is operated according to some 
prescribed formula. Individual users may own rights to the release flow 
similar to the natural flowing water rights. Trading of both long- and short- 
term release rights among users and/or the authority is usually not res- 
tricted. 
3 .  Short-term aalea of w a t e c  Under this policy, there is no long-term water 
rights allocation. Instead, water is distributed or redistributed to or  among 
prospective users just prior to use. This approach can be operated in two 
different ways similar to policies 1 and 2. Under one of these, short-term 
natural flowing water rights are distributed to potential users just prior to 
use. In addition, users may own storage rights and manage their storages as 
they see appropriate. Exchanges of long- and short-term storage rights as 
well as short-term water rights among users and/or the authority are 
allowed whenever possible. Alternatively, natural flowing water rights and 
the reservoir in its entirety may be owned by the authority similar to the 
management of release rights. The authority operates the reservoir accord- 
ing to some formula which may or  may not be known to the users. 
Released outflow is distributed to the users just prior to use and there is no 
individually owned storage rights allocation. 
4. A n y  combination of the above policiea: Combinations of any of the above poli- 
cies may be applicable in practice. 
The above list outlines the overall operating policies of each approach. Under 
these integrated systems as well as under traditional practices, there are sources of 
inefficency from an econonlic perspective. A discussion of these sources can be found 
in the next subsection. 
3.2 SOURCES OF INEFFICIENCY UNDER EXS'IlNG AND PROPOSED 
WATER RESOURCES AND RESERVOIR PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 
POLICIES 
Under conventional water and reservoir planning and management practices, 
there are two main sources of inefficiency from an economic perspective, regardless of 
the kinds of prevalent water rights doctrine. One of these is that water rights are no t  
truly marketable; i.e., exchanges of rights are usually limited or  prohibited. The other is 
that economic value o r  benefit estimates based on traditional engineering economic 
analysis may not reflect their true values faithfully. 
I t  is reasonable to believe that by eliminating these sources of inefficiency, our  
water supply as well as the overall economic efficiency might be expected to improve. I t  
is precisely with this in mind that the proposed policies for integrating marketable water 
rights systems with the reservoir system are developed. The efficiency loss due to res- 
trictions on spot trading n a y  be expected to be recaptured by lifting the trading limita- 
tion (i-e., by allowing trading as freely as possible). Furthermore, estimates of economic 
values of water use and storage may be improved by making use of bids tendered by the 
users, o r  of information obtained from other market transactions (such as the marketr 
clearing price for rights, etc.) 
3.2.1 Restrictions on Spot Trading 
Imposing restrictions on the trading of rights may affect the economic efficiency 
of the programs in at least three ways: 
1 .  Efficiency loss due to inefficient use of all available water resources cannot 
be recaptured, even when no misallocation of (long-term base) rights 
occurs. 
2.  Efficiency loss due to misallocation of long-term rights cannot be recovered. 
3. Efficiency loss due to the selection of suboptimal reservoir size may not be 
recouped. 
These three kinds of efficiency loss are further discussed in order in the following para- 
graphs. 
Consider a water use region consisting of a number of water users, each holding 
separate water rights for his own use only. Whether these rights are riparian rights, 
prior appropriative rights o r  others does not matter. When exchanges of rights are not 
allowed, there is really no mechanism to drive the use of water to its highest and best 
use in terms of economic value. There is a limit in economic value each user can 
garner, even with the use of storage facilities. Each user can at most use as much water 
as he owns until his marginal benefit reaches zero. In the event these rights are allowed 
to be exchanged among users just prior to use, higher efficiency could be accomplished 
by two means: A user may buy water from others, if available, at a price no greater 
than his marginal benefit. He may use it right away o r  store it for future use, if storage 
facilities are available. Conversely, he may sell his water (or  lease his storage, if avail- 
able) to others at a price greater than his marginal benefit, if somebody is willing to pay 
for it. Hence, the individual as well as the overall efficiencies attained would be no less 
than that obtained when trading is restricted. 
The next discussion concerns the misallocation of nontradable rights. In the 
absence of provision for trading, the most a user can do is to make the best of storage 
facilities to achieve a higher efficiency. If there is misallocation of rights, some of the 
efficiency losses may not be recovered. For example, it may happen that a switch in the 
allocation of long-term rights between two users (or  between a user and a potential user 
who receives no rights) may yield a higher overall efficiency. The difference between 
the two efficiencies resulting from the two different allocations is the inefficiency due to 
misallocation of long-term rights. Imposing restrictions on trading would prevent this 
from being recaptured. 
If reservoirs are sized using an economic criterion, restrictions on trading of 
water rights might also affect the size of reservoir chosen. Since the selection of the 
reservoir size is dependent upon the cost of reservoir and the benefit derived from its 
use, a suboptimal efficiency performance (due to trading prohibition) might lead to a 
suboptimal size of reservoir being chosen. If, a t  a later time, the reservoir is found to 
be smaller than the optimal (efficient) size, there may be some ways to increase the 
capacity to some extent, probably at a much higher marginal cost. On the other hand, if 
the reservoir is oversized, the excess capital spent on its construction as well as the 
related operation and maintenance costs are lost. 
Under traditional policies, generally there are limitations o r  problems in the 
transfer of rights, and trading of rights is usually discouraged, which prevents some of 
the economic efficiency from being recaptured. However, the proposed integrated sys- 
tems are designed to allow exchange of these rights more freely; thus increasing the 
efficiency of the systems. 
3.2.2 Inaccurate Economic Values or Benefita Btimation 
Besides trading restrictions, another source of inefficiency under existing water 
and reservoir policies is that estimates of benefits or economic values may not be close 
to their real values. When the authority uses benefit data of insufficient accuracy to 
determine the reservoir size and/or the distribution of water rights/water, suboptimal 
size selection and/or misallocation of rights may result, leading to a loss of efficiency. 
Inaccurate estimation may be caused by (1)  imperfect information about users' 
economic values or benefits, and ( 2 )  uncertainties in predicting future events. 
3.2.2.1 Incomplete Knowledge of Users' Economic Values or Benefite 
Under traditional policies, benefits estimated by the authority based o n  engineer- 
ing costbenefi t  studies are often found to be different from their true values due to 
incomplete information about the users' production o r  benefit functions. For  example, 
benefit estimates for federal projects have been criticized as not  reflecting their actual 
values (see, e.g., Hirshleifer et al., 1969; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1974, 19781. 
However, in an integrated marketable water rights and reservoir system, bids tendered 
by the users and other  market  information may provide sufficient data to obtain better 
estimations. 
3.2.2.2 Uncertainties in Predicting Future Events 
This source of inefficiency cannot be completely eliminated under either the 
traditional/nonmarket o r  proposed integrated systems, since future events cannot be 
predicted with absolute certainty. Two kinds of events are of interest in this study. 
They are the physical events (such as streamflow, rainfall, etc.) and the economic events 
(such as product prices and marginal values of water use o r  storage). I t  should be noted 
that  physical uncertainties may also have an effect on the outcome of economic events 
in some applications. Uncertainties in predicting both types of events occur in both sys- 
tems. Of course, predictions can be improved by means of better forecasting o r  projec- 
tion techniques. However, under an integrated system, sometimes the economic events 
could be predicted more accurately with information from the market  transactions. 
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4. METHODS OF EVALUATlON 
The preceding section described alternatives for integrating marketable water 
rights systems with a system of reservoir design and operation. In this section, an 
analytical approach for evaluating either quantitatively or qualitatively the performance 
(primarily economic efficiency) of these alternatives is presented. The framework of  
analysis adopted in this study consists of four parts or stages: 
1) First, an upper bound on the economic efficiency of the integrated systems 
is established. 
2) To simulate more realistic situations, the effect of uncertainties (due to 
incomplete knowledge of future events) on the performance of the 
integrated systems is studied by examining two programs with specific reser- 
voir operating policies. 
3) A number of scenarios are devised from which the contributions of 
different components of the integrated systems (e.g., water rights definition 
or  base rights) to the system performance are determined. 
4) Finally, the effects of uncertainties in predicting future events are further 
investigated by differentiating events of various attributes (such as physical 
or economic) . 
The programs o r  scenarios constructed for the purpose of analysis are discussed in this 
section and summarized in Table 4-1 
Although there are a number of objectives intended to be attained by an 
integrated marketable water rights and reservoir system, these objectives are usually 
difficult or impossible to quantify, save economic efficiency. Furthermore, the 
integrated systems make use of water storage facilities and work on the economic princi- 
ple of competition in the marketplace to promote a higher use of water. For these re* 
sons, this study focuses on the economic efficiency of the programs. Other objectives, 
as well as their tradeoff s, will be discussed qualitatively after the results with regard to 
the efficiency objective are obtained. 
In the next subsection, discussions and a mathematical formulation for deter- 
mining the economic efficiencies of the optimal integrated marketable water rights and 
reservoir system (OptIS) are presented. The formulation is expressed as a mathematical 
program. 
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4.1 OPTIMAL INTEGRATED MARKETABLE WA'IYZR RIGHTS AND RESER 
VOIR SYSTEM (OptIS) 
The optimal integrated marketable water rights and reservoir system is one 
which results in the maximum possible aggregate net  benefit. Such a system may 
operate in any mode as described in subsection 3.1. It serves as an upper bound on the 
economic efficiency of the market and nonmarket programs. 
The optimal integrated marketable water rights and reservoir system may be for- 
mulated as follows: 
Subject to the following sets of constraints: 
i)  Continuity equations 
V, = Vt-, + It - Lt - Ot1 V t € T  
ii) Storage and capacity constraints 
vtm" 5 V, 5 ( V"' - V/ ), v t € T  
i i i )  Useful utilization 
iv) Available outflow (releases) 
v )  Initial and boundary conditions 
v, = vp, v t € P  
vi) Fixed Costs 
vii) Other constraints, if applicable 
where 
Z = aggregate net benefit; 
f l" = cost factor a t  time t ;  
Bu,t = user u's water use benefit at time t ;  
amount of water applied by user u a t  time t; 
user u's variable cost at time t; 
binary variable (0 or 1) designating the exclusion or  inclusion of the 
fixed cost for user u;  
user u's fixed cost; 
cost of reservoir; 
storage at  time t; 
inflow to the reservoir at time t; 
evaporative, seepage and other losses from the reservoir at time t ;  
outflow from the reservoir at time t; 
minimum storage required at time t; 
capacity (size) of reservoir; 
storage space reserved for other uses a t  time t; 
user u's minimum demand for water at time t; 
user u's maximum demand for water a t  time t; 
(given) storage at time t; 
set of all time (periods); 
subset of time (periods), TOE T; 
set of all prospective water users; 
number at least as large as the maximum value of C Dun,;  
I€ T 
time index; and 
user index. 
In this formulation, the objective function is taken to be the aggregate net 
benefit of water use. The variables DUnt and VmaZ correspond to the individual water 
usages and the size of reservoir, respectively. Because there is no restriction on the 
trading of rights (there is no constraint in the formulation restricting such transactions), 
water users could buy or  sell water in excess of their needs, and hence, individual water 
usages may be greater or less than their corresponding allocations. I t  should be noted 
that neither the formulation requires the specification of rights allocations nor the solu- 
tion of the formulation provides such information. Under the assumptions of optimal 
trading and optimal releases, the optimal aggregate net benefit of water use is indepen- 
dent of initial rights allocations. 
4.2 PRACITCABLE PROGRAMS WITH SPECIFIC RESERVOIR OPERAnNG 
POLICIES 
The preceding subsection presents a mathematical formulation for determining 
the optimal efficiency of the integrated marketable water rights and reservoir system?. 
However, since future events cannot be predicted with absolute certainty, in reality, the 
decisions on water releases from the reservoir quite often are suboptimal from an 
economic point of view. In making such decisions, the authority or users must rely on 
some kind of information obtained before o r  a t  the time of actual operation. 
In order to determine how much efficiency may be lost due to uncertainties in 
predicting future events, two integrated marketable water rights and reservoir programs 
with different reservoir operation policies, which may be applied in practice, are exam- 
ined in this subsection. Both release policies chosen in this study are based on some 
predetermined parameters which may be derived from historical uses, future projec- 
tions, market information o r  others. One of these policies is the simple linear decision 
rule (o r  sometimes called the target storage rule). Under the other policy, releases are 
functions of the expected marginal values of storage and individual water uses. The two 
prog;ams based on these operating policies are discussed in the following two subsec- 
tions. In this study, central administration is assumed under the practicable programs. 
For the decentralized mode of operation (i.e., when individual users manage their 
rights), the overall economic gain is expected to be higher. 
Note that these are but two of the numerous possible release policies and they 
are by no means the most sophisticated ones. For example, under another policy, the 
optimal intended releases may be derived by solving the formulation (P-1) with the vari- 
ables I , ,  D and ~ : f ~ s  replaced by their respective expected o r  projected values. 
However, the actual releases do not follow exactly these release determinations. They 
depend on the actual availability of water and, if known, the range of demand at the 
time. If the results call for a release of a certain amount, then the actual release would 
be whatever amount is available up to but not exceeding this amount o r  the maximum 
demand (with the exception of overspill, of course). The actual benefit can be obtained 
from these releases and the actual marginal values of water use. 
4.2.1 Releases Determined by a Simple Linear Release Rule (PracP-LDR) 
Under this scheme, it is assumed that water is released from the resewoir 
according to a simple linear decision rule (see, e.g., ReVelle et  al. [1969]) in which the 
intended release during a particular period is determined from the available storage by 
means of a linear equation with a predetermined constant for that period. The actual 
outflow (intended release plus overspill) is also related to the capacity of the resewoir. 
If the predetermined constant is restricted to be no greater than the maximum reservoir 
capacity, then this simple linear decision rule can be interpreted as a target storage rule 
(see also Loucks e t  al. [1981]). Specifically the release policy ca.n be stated as follows: If 
the amount of water available is less than the predetermined target storage, then no 
water is released in that particular period; otherwise, whatever amount available is 
2 0 
released until the target storage is reached. Mathematically, the release in period t ,  Ot, 
under a cyclic use pattern, may be written as (in the form of a LDR): 
0, =max ( Vt- l+lt- Lt- SpC, 0) 
+ max [ min ( Vt-l+It- Lt,  $1- Vmz, 0 1, V t €  T  (4-8a) 
s," 2 01 (4-8b) 
or  (in the form of a target release rule) 
0, =max ( Vt- l+It- Lt- SpC, 0),  
0 5 s; 5 vma=, 
an d 
p = t  mod np, (4-10) 
where Si is the target storage for period p,  and np is the number of periods in a 
periodic time cycle (e.g. 12 months in a year). The first part on the right hand side of 
Eq. (4-8a) denotes the intended release whereas the last part denotes overspill, if any. 
This policy may be represented by the mathematical program (P-1) with addi- 
tional constraints (4-8a, 4-8b) or  (4-9a, 4-9b) and (4-10) in the form of a release rule. 
4.2.2 Releases Based on the Marginal Values of Starage and Water Use (PracP- 
WW 
Under this policy, each period's water usage and storage are determined from a 
predetermined curve of marginal value of storage and the actual o r  expected marginal 
values of water uses for that period (depending on whether or  not they are known at  
that time). I t  works in the following manner: Release and use as  much water as is avail- 
able until the (expected) marginal value of water storage is greater than that of water 
use; and then save as much water as is available (limited by the reservoir capacity) until 
the marginal value of water use is greater than that of storage, and so on. In other 
words, if the marginal value of water use is greater than that of storage, then use it 
instead of saving it for future use, and vice versa. 
Let Er and E/ be the marginal value functions of water use and storage, respec- 
tively, a t  time t .  This scheme can be represented by the optimization problem (P-1) 
with the following additional constraints on the releases (under a cyclic use pattern): 
0, =( Vt-, + It - L,) - min( Vmaz,S/), V t € T  (4-11) 
where the intended storage at time t, S;, is determined by maximizing the economic 
values, 
si 
subject to the water availability constraints 
St" + S;) = Vt-1 + It - Lt (4-13) 
where 
p = t  mod np, (4-14) 
np is the number of periods in a periodic cycle, St" is the intended water use at time t ,  
A is the amount of water applied and S is the amount of storage. The first term on the 
righthand-side of Eq. (4-11) is the amount of water available at time t. The last term 
in Eq. (4-11) simply means that the actual storage cannot be greater than the maximum 
capacity of reservoir. 
In this study, a specific storage value curve of the following form is assumed: 
EpsCeS, i f O < S < S i  
w; ={ 
O 1 otherwise 
where W: is the economic value function of storage at week p ,  S is the amount of 
storage, and E; is the marginal value of storage up to S;. In other words, the release 
rule for each week consists of two parameters, the target storage (S i ) ,  and the marginal 
value of storage (EpeC). Furthermore, the intended storage at time t, St8, is reduced to 
the following form: 
where 
SS is the target storage for week p in every season, 
E,BC is the marginal value of storage for week p in every season, and 
is the set  of water users whose marginal values of water use are higher 
than EpsC for week t. 
The expression inside the parentheses denotes the total available water at week t. The 
summation term that follows is the amount of water needed by those users whose mar- 
ginal values of water use are higher than the marginal value of storage. The maz oper* 
tor requires that the amount of water remaining for storage allocation and for allocation 
to users with lower marginal values of water use must be nonnegative. The min opera- 
tor restricts the amount of intended storage to be no greater than the predetermined 
storage level. 
For this program, two schemes, each with a different set of release parameter 
values, are considered in this study. In one of these, the release parameters and, hence, 
the aggregate net benefit, are optimally determined. In the other scheme, suboptimal 
release parameter values are used to determine the aggregate net benefit. These subop- 
timal weekly release parameter values are derived from the expected marginal values o f  
storage and expected storages, assuming there is no  correlation between the two. 
3.3 SCENARIOS USED FOR EXAMINING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE 
DESIGN OF THE INTEGR.ATED SYSTEM 
The integrated marketable water rights and reservoir systems are assumed to 
consist of two stages: (1)  the distribution and exchanges of long-term rights in the base 
market, and ( 2 )  trading of shorbterm rights in the spot market. To examine the impor- 
tance of these two stages of rights allocation/reallocation, a number  of scenarios are 
constructed. One of these is that no  long-term rights are available and only relatively 
shorbterm rights are exchanged in the spot market. Under the other scenarios, spot  
trading is restricted o r  limited after the allocation of long-term rights. 
3.3.1 Optimal System with Spot Rights Only (Optspot) 
There is no long-term allocation o f  rights under this scenario. This is one of the 
operating policies described in subsection 3.1. In a competitive environment, the 
market  outcome is expected to be the same as the integrated marketable water rights 
and reservoir systems with both long- and shorbterm rights (OptIS), if there is no addi- 
tional capital expenditure involved. However, when capital investment in water use 
facilities o r  equipment is needed, some users may make the wrong capital investment 
decisions because there is no long-term basis for planning. This effect is difficult to 
investigate because there are numerous possible outcomes to such a situation. How- 
ever, it seems logical to assume a scenario in which all prospective users believe it is 
profitable for them to use water, and hence, they invest in the necessary capital equip- 
ment. Some of these users later may find o u t  that they have made the wrong decisions 
and they should not  have used any water at  all. 
This scenario may be represented by formulation (P-1) in which the sets of 
prospective and actual users are equivalent. In other words, 
bU = I ,  V U E U  (4-17) 
3.3.2 Optimal Nonmarket System 
To compare the economic efficiency of the integrated marketable water rights 
and reservoir systems with that  of the nonmarket approaches, two policies are con- 
2 3 
sidered here. One of these systems d e a l s e x c l u ~ i v e l ~  with release rights (i.e., outflow 
from the reservoir); the other considers separate storage and natural flow rights. 
Exchange of rights is limited o r  no t  allowed under  either scheme. 
Under  the release rights policy and one version of the separate rights policy, 
water rights are assumed to be prioritized steady use rights (PSUR's). A PSUR is a 
heterogeneous good comprising two parameters, viz., size and juniority. The size of a 
PSUR is the maximum quantity of water that  can be used by the rights owner when the 
available flow exceeds a certain amount  which is termed juniority (see Eheart and Lyon 
[I9831 and Wong [1985]). Under another version of the separate rights policy, flow 
rights are assumed to be fractional flow rights (FFR's) .  
3.3.2.1 Release Rights Policy (0ptNM.R.RPSUR) 
Under  this policy, it is assumed that the authority owns the reservoir and is in 
command of the natural flowing water rights. Long-term rights to water released from 
the reservoir are allocated to the users and no exchanges of spot rights are allowed. 
A mathematical formulation for determining the optimal economic efficiency of 
the system is the same as that  of  the optimal integrated marketable water rights and 
reservoir system (i.e., P-1) with the fol!owing additional sets of constraints: 
and 
Uu = { k € U  I Pk>Pu ), 
where 
OU, t is the amount  of water allocated to user u a t  time t ,  
PU is user u ' s  priority of receiving (release) water allocation, 
SU is user u 's  size of (release) water rights, and 
UU is the se t  of water users who have a higher priority of receiving (release) 
water allocation than user u .  
Interpretations of constraints (4-18 and 4- 19) are straightforward. They simply 
mean that, a t  a certain time, individuals' water uses are less than o r  equal to their allo- 
cations and the total water allocations cannot be greater than the releases from the 
reservoir. Note that  constraint (4-5) is redundant with these two sets of constraints in 
the formulation (P-1).  
Constraints (4-20) and (4-21) define the water allocation to user u according to 
the priority and size of his water rights. In Eq. (4-20), the term C Sk is the total 
k E U, 
amount  of water allocated to those users who have a higher priority than user u .  By 
subtracting this amount from the resewoir outflow at time t ,  Of, the amount  of water, 
if any, remaining for allocation to other users is obtained. The min operator in the 
equation restricts the allocation to user u to be no greater than his right size, Su. 
4.3.2.2 Separate Flaw and Storage Rights Policy (0ptNM.SR-PSUR and 
0ptNM.SRFFR) 
Under this scheme, individual users own separate natural flowing water rights 
and storage rights. These users manage their storages as they see appropriate. This pol- 
icy may be applicable to regions with o r  without preexisting natural water rights alloca- 
tio ns. 
Water rights are assumed allocated prior to (perhaps much earlier than) the allo- 
cation of storage rights. Long term trading of water rights may be allowed before, and 
without the knowledge of, the allocation of storage rights. After the allocation of 
storage rights, exchange of both rights is prohibited. 
Similar to the earlier scheme on  release rights, this policy can also be 
represented by the mathematical formulation (P-1) with additional constraints to specify 
the rights for the individual users. However, because of the much larger number  of 
variables involved (due to the separation of flow and storage rights), it is deemed 
appropriate to reformulate the system as follows: 
(P-2): 
Subject to the following sets of constraints: 
i) Continuity equations 
ii) Storage and capacity constraints 
iii) Useful utilization 
iv) Available outflow (releases) 
v )  Initial and boundary conditions 
vi) Water (flow) rights allocations 
for PSUR: 
for FFR:  
where 
I u , t  = f u * I t 1  
0 5 1 ,  511  
C f u  5 1 1  
u €  u 
vii) Fixed Costs 
user u l s  storage at time t; 
user u ' s  inflow a t  time t; 
user u's evaporative, seepage and other losses from the reservoir a t  time t ;  
user u ' s  outflow from the reservoir at  time t ;  
user u l s  maximum storage capacity (size); 
user u 's  minimum storage capacity (size); 
storage space reserved for other uses; 
(given) user u 's  storage at  time t; 
user u's priority of receiving (natural flowing) water allocation; 
user u 's  size of (natural flowing) water rights; 
se t  of water users who have a higher priority of receiving (natural flowing) 
water than user u ;  
user u 's  fractional water right; 
and the other symbols and notation are the same as those in the formulation (P-1). 
(The subscript u refers to user u and the associated variables have similar meanings as 
those without it.) 
Alternatively, storage rights, VU*", could be defined with respect to the max- 
imum reservoir capacity or  the maximum available reservoir capacity. Constraints (4- 
24) may be rewritten as 
where 
f , B 1  = user u's fractional storage defined in terms of the maximum reservoir 
capacity; and 
f i 2  = user u'.s fractional storage defined in terms of the maximum available 
reservoir capacity. 
This policy, as represented by formulation (P-2), is difficult to solve directly 
because of the large number of variables and constraints involved. In this study, a 
further assumption is made that the distribution of flow rights is optimal when no 
storage is used. This assumption is reasonable, although it may yield a suboptimal net 
benefit when storage rights are also considered. For example, the optimal distribution 
of flow rights may be arrived at through gradual exchanges of rights approved by the 
water administrative authority, or from a previous water rights market. 
4.4 SCENARIOS USED FOR ADDRESSING 'LHE EFFEC;IS OF UNCE3RTAIN 
TIES OF DIF'FEZWNT ATIRTBUTES 
4.4.1 Uncertainties in Predicting Marginal EconomicVaiues of Water Use (EMV7.J) 
This scenario is of theoretical interest only. I t  is not realistic in that physical 
events such as streamflow are assumed known with absolute certainty. The reasons for 
its inclusion in this study are that (1)  it deals with one kind of uncertainty-that of the 
marginal values of water-and (2)  that the results may be obtained with relative ease 
from the existing formulation for the optimal integrated system. 
Let W ( = B u t  - C )  and E be user u's value and marginal value of 
water use, respectively, a t  time t. By replacing the individual marginal values of water 
use, EUvt's, with their expected values, E,Cet's, in the formulation for the optimal policy, 
i.e., (P-1), the corresponding water uses by each user in each period can be determined 
by solving the same formulation. The E,CSt7s are determined from the following expres- 
sions: 
= { j € T  I j m o d  np = t m o d n p  ), (4-33b) 
where nc is the number of periodic cycle, Tt is the se t  o f  a particular period in every 
cycle. By resubstituting the resulting values of the individual uses, DUrt ' s ,  (which are 
optimal fo r  the E,CSt1s instead of the actual EUpt7s)  into the objective function, the actual 
net  benefit may be obtained. 
4.4.2 Uncertainties in Predicting Physical Eventa 
In this subsection, the more realistic situation in which physical events (such as 
streamflow, I ,  and the ranges of useful water usages, D U y r  and D:?) cannot be 
predicted with absolute certainty, is examined. However, the marginal values of water 
use are assumed to be known. This latter assumption may not  be realistic. For  exam- 
ple, the marginal values of water in many industrial uses are known in advance of the 
actual usage, but  those used for agricultural purposes probably will not  be known with 
great certainty. Note that physical uncertainties sometimes may also lead to uncertain- 
ties in the marginal values of water use. 
Numerous scenarios can be devised under these assumptions because there are 
practically an infinite number of ways of determining the proper releases. A s  a matter 
of fact, for the two release rules (LDR and MVS&U basis) chosen earlier, two scenarios 
can be constructed by using the actual marginal values of water use to determine the 
actual distribution of water among users. 
5. APPLICATION: A PORTION OF 
'PHE LITTLE W M H  W I N  OF ILLINOIS 
In order to evaluate the efficiency quantitatively (and the other objectives quali- 
tatively), representative resu Its of application of the integrated marketable water rights 
and reservoirs systems in a realistic environment are required. This section describes a 
case study in which these integrated systems as well as others discussed in the preceding 
section are simulated using a data base consisting of hypothetical, but  in most  respects 
realistic, data and some real data on irrigation water use. Description of the data base 
and other pertinent information can be found in the next subsection. Results and dis- 
cussion of the application are presented in the last portion of this section. 
5.1 DATABASE AND COsTDATADESCRIPTiON 
Libby [I9821 and Wong and Eheart [1983] used the data base of the Little 
Wabash Basin of Illinois for a preliminary study of marketable water rights systems in 
the absence of storage facilities. The Little Wabash Basin data se t  is partly hypothetical 
and partly empirical, and the reader may refer to the above two sources as well as 
Eheart and Libby (19811, from which the data base is derived, for further information. 
I t  is assumed that there are twenty-five potential water users, each with a 
different production function and revenue generating function. These users are 
assumed to be farm owners who use water from the nearby Little Wabash River o r  . 
from a shallow aquifer, which is hydraulically connected to the stream, to irrigate, on a 
weekly basis, their fields in which the crop corn (Zea  Maya L.) is grown. The price of 
corn is assumed to be $3.50/bushel ($99.32/m3), which is slightly higher than the 
current market  value, but  is about the same as during the drought periods in 1980-81. 
The corn yield model (Model 3)  developed by Leeper et al. [1974] is used to 
determine the production functions by varying one of the model parameters-the avail- 
able water-holding capacity within the root  zone-to account for  the soil characteristics 
which are assumed to be different in the various plots. The available water-holding 
capacities within the root  zones for the twenty-five plots are assumed to range from 2 to 
9.68 inches (5.08 to 24.59 cm) in increments of 0.32 inch (0.81 cm).  Throughout this 
study (as well as in the other two studies on marketable water rights mentioned earlier), 
user 1 refers to the plot owner whose available water-holding capacity within the root  
zone is 2 inches (5.08 cm),  user 2, 2.32 inches (5.89 cm) and so on.  
Fifty-eight years of historical records of weekly precipitation, streamflow, and 
mean maximum air temperature needed for the determination of corn production and, 
hence, revenue are available for the 10-week growing season (from May 6 to July 14 
inclusively) considered in this study. 
There are two special properties of this data base: ( I )  Although all the users 
have different production functions, which are related to the amount of water applied, 
the mean maximum temperature, and the precipitation, these functions are rather 
homogeneous in the ranges considered. In other words, in the absence of storage facili- 
ties, users who value water most in a certain week usually have higher values for water 
than the other users in all other weeks. (2 )  The individual maximum demand for water 
in a particular week is the same for all the users. Nevertheless, this data base is helpful 
in the analysis of the performance of the integrated systems of marketable water rights 
and reservoir design and operation. Other data bases with more diversified water use 
patterns might be useful in future studies, although there is no indication that the 
current data base leads to confined or restricted conclusions about the performance of 
these systems. 
In this study, all of the analyses are carried ou t  on the ex ante (i.e., expected 
value) basis. An annual discount rate of 10% and an economic life of 10 years for the 
irrigation equipment are assumed. Each season ( a  10-week period) of historical 
streamflow, temperature, and precipitation values are assumed to have equal probability 
of occurrence. The 58 years of record cover a wide range of climatological and hydrolo- 
gic conditions, including both dry and wet seasons. Unless otherwise stated, the follow- 
ing expressions or  values of different parameters or variables (in the formulations 
described in Section 4 as well as throughout the report) are used: 
U = { 1,2, . - . ,24,25), 
nP = 10 weeks, 
nc = 58 years o r  seasons, 
v f = 0, 
vumm = 0, V U E U  (2 = $68.54/acre-year, V U E U  
SU = 2 inches-plot, V U E U  
(i.e., the sizes of prioritized or  appropriative rights are equivalent to 2 inches of water 
for a plot, the maximum weekly demand for water.) Furthermore, 
If = l /nc = 1/(58 years),' 
vtmin = 0, 
v/ = o ,  
Lt = 0.15 ( Vt- ,+Vt), 
It = weekly streamflow, 
(i.e., no instream flow requirement is assumed.) 
Duly = (2  inches - rainfall during week t )  X plot area, 
DCI" = 0, 
VP - v m a z  1 
VUb, t = vumazl 
where the set To is defined as 
(i.e., the reservoir is assumed to be filled to its maximum capacity at the beginning of 
each growing season). The value of water to each user in each week is directly propor- 
tional to the amount of water applied. That is, 
where EUvt is the proportionality constant, or in other words, user u 's  marginal value of 
water use at time t. 
In order to facilitate the analysis, and because of the corn production model 
chosen, some assumptions are oversimplified; e.g., full reservoir at the beginning of 
each growing season, linear relationships of water use and production between certain 
ranges of water application, etc. Some of them may be made more realistic if desired, 
and the overall methodology and approach used in this study may still be applied. 
5.1.1 Reservoir h t  
The present worth cost of the reservoir of size V in acre-feet (1233 m3) and 
land price K in dollars per acre ($2.47/hectare), is given in dollars by the expression 
jR ( 9161 V'.5444 + 0.49 V'.86QQ K ), which is based on the empirical cost function 
developed by Dawes and Wathne [1968]. The cost adjusting factor, j R ,  is taken to be 
2.364 which is based on the ratio of the 1978 cost index for water resources projects to 
the same index for 1964, the base year the cost expression was derived. The price of 
land, f R . ~ ,  needed for the conversion to a reservoir is assumed to be either zero to 
represent rough idle lands o r  $1750/acre ($4324/hectare) which represents the average 
cost (1978 base year) of removing farm lands from production in the basin. The annual 
operation and maintenance cost is assumed to be 5%of the total project cost. Assuming 
a discount rate of 10% per year and a reservoir life-span of 100 years, the annual total 
cost of reservoir in dollars, cR, may be computed from the following expression: 
cR = 12451 1 V0.5444 + 9.98536 V0.*'" K (5-1) 
where the land cost, K ,  is expressed in dollars/hectare, and the reservoir capacity, V, in 
million cubic meters. 
Figure 5-1 shows the relationship of the annual cost of a reservoir to its storage 
capacity for the case of zero land cost as well as for a land cost of $1750/acre 
($4324/hectare). Note that the curve with zero land cost is rather flat in the range con- 
sidered, while the other curve (with nonzero land cost) increases significantly as the size 
of the reservoir increases, indicating that the cost of the reservoir is sensitive to the 
price of land needed for the conversion to the reservoir. 
There are five or  six identified potential reservoir sites with capacity ranging 
from 500 to 160,000 acre-feet (0.62 to 197.36 million cubic meters) available in the 
region, according to a study by the Illinois State Water Survey [bawes and Terstriep, 
19661. The topography and land costs in Illinois indicate that, for the construction cost 
alone, economies of scale occur up to at least about 40,000 acre-feet (49.34 million cubic 
meters) which is the maximum size of storage capacity used in the development of the 
reservoir cost expression by D awes and Wathne [ 19681. 
5.1.2 Land Area 
In the studies by Libby [I9821 and Wong and Eheart [1983], each individual plot 
area was assumed to be 320 acres (129.50 hectares) of which 280 acres (113.31 hectares) 
are used for planting. For this plot size, the maximum aggregate economic value that 
can be derived from the use of the reservoir, assuming there is always water to satisfy 
all demand, is at most 20% more than that obtained from natural streamflow use only. 
Furthermore, after deducting the cost of the reservoir, the net benefit resulting from 
the use of the reservoir may be even less than that obtained without a reservoir. 
With an increase in the land area developedfor irrigation, the profitability of irri- 
gated farms is expected to increase. Hence, in this study a portion of the land upstream 
of Clay City (where the stream is gaged), besides the original 8,000 acres (3237.49 
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hectares) of land used in the other studies, is also considered for irrigation. The indivi- 
dual plot sizes are assumed to be 3,200 acres (1,295 hectares), of which 87.5%are used 
for planting. This land area (80,000 acres) is ten times larger than the original land area 
considered and it is about 50% as likely that streamflow would exceed demand. 
5.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Based on the solution methods described in Wong (19851, the maximum annual 
aggregate economic values that  can possibly be attained under each program and 
scenario are obtained for various fixed sizes of resenroir. These results are plotted in 
Figure 5-2. 
As explained earlier, the term economic value used in this study means benefit 
less non-resenroir related costs. By subtracting the resenroir costs (Figure 5-1) from the 
aggregate economic values (Figure 5-2), the maximum aggregate ne t  benefits that can 
possibly be achieved under various programs and scenarios are obtained for various 
reservoir capacities. Figures 5-3 and 5-4 display these annual aggregate n e t  benefits for 
the case of zero land cost and for a land cost of $1750/acre ($4324/hectare), respec- 
tive ly. 
Figures 5-2 through 5-4, each comprised of nine curves, provide a means of 
comparison of the economic efficiency performance of all the programs and scenarios 
examined. However, to clarify the explanation, the aggregate economic values and/or 
the ne t  benefits for selected groups of programs and scenarios will also be shown in 
separate graphs. 
5.2.1 Revenues, Profib and Reservoir Sizes for the Optimal Integrated System 
Under the proposed marketable water rights and reservoir systems, the reservoir 
would usually be financed, in part o r  entirely, by payments from the users. For  a cer- 
tain size of reservoir, there is always a maximum amount  the users are willing to pay for 
the storage they need. The maximum revenue that can be generated from the 
integrated system, assuming perfect foresight within seasons ( o r  alternatively, equal pro- 
bability of occurrence of historical seasonal events), optimal releases and optimal spot  
trading, may be derived from the economic value curve for the optimal integrated sys- 
tem (see Wong [1985] for the procedure of its derivation). 
Two different assumptions regarding the allocation of flowing water rights are 
considered here. One is that water rights are distributed free of charge to the users, or ,  
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if the water rights are distributed to the users a t  a cost, the revenue is not  used to offset  
the cost of the reservoir project (e.g., when there is a long time lag between the a l locs  
tion of water rights and the decision on resewoir construction). In the other case, water 
rights are distributed to the users at a cost to cover part o r  all of the expenditure for the 
resewoir project. For  this latter case, two distributional procedures are considered in 
this study. They are the allocation of FFR's by a single price auction and the allocation 
of PSUR's by a sequential second price auction. The annual revenues generated from 
these three cases are plotted in Figure 5-5. The cuwes for the two cases with revenue 
from water rights allocation are higher than the one without such financial transfer by an 
amount  equal to $ 1 . 7 3 ~ 0 ~  for the FFR allocations and $ 2 . 1 8 ~ 1 0 ~  for the PSUR alloca- 
tions. 
The maximum profits that  can be attained for various sizes of resewoir are 
obtained by subtracting the resewoir cost from the revenue. The annual maximum 
profits f o r  various reservoir sizes are plotted in Figures 5-6 and 5-7 for the case of zero 
land cost and for a land cost of $1750/acre ($4324/hectare), respectively. 
A governmental agency which owns and operates the resewoir  may want to 
operate on a nonprofit basis. Note that  operating on a nonprofit basis does not  neces- 
sarily mean operating at  the size such that revenue equals cost for some positive reser- 
voir size. In general, the nontrival zero profit resewoir size may lie to the right or  left 
of the maximum net  benefit size. However, under the decreasing marginal cost and 
benefit assumptions in this study and for the case without prior revenue from water 
rights allocation, it always lies to the left. In case the nonprofit size is larger than the 
maximum ne t  benefit size, the entity owning the resewoir may want to cut  back the size 
of resewoir and operate at  the maximum ne t  benefit size. The excess revenue gen- 
erated may be redistributed among users o r  even nonusers. However, care should be 
taken to ensure that the disposition of this excess revenue does not  lead to strategic bid- 
ding o r  o ther  problems. 
From Figure 5-6, the nontrival zero profit resewoir sizes for the case of zero 
land cost are found to be greater than 1 2 0 x 1 0 ~  m3 both for the FFR and PSUR curves, 
and 4 8 x 3 0 ~  m3 for the case with no  prior water rights income. Similarly, for  a land cost 
of $1750/acre ($4324/hectare), these sizes are found from Figure 5-7 to be 5 8 x 1 0 ~  m3, 
6 7 x 1 0 ~  m3 and 3 0 x 1 0 ~  m3. Thus, the nontrival zero profit sizes are very sensitive to the 
land cost, and hence reservoir cost. 
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The maximum ne t  benefits for  the optimal integrated system occur a t  reservoir 
sizes of  6 0 x 1 0 ~  m3 for the case of zero land cost and 3 4 x 1 0 ~  m3 for a land cost of 
$1750/acre ($4324/hectare). Hence, it is shown that in this study, in the absence of 
prior revenue for water rights allocation, the revenue generated is no t  sufficient to build 
a reservoir a t  the maximum net  benefit size (cf., 48 to 60, and 30 to 34 rnillion cubic 
meters). However, with prior revenue generated frorn the allocation of water rights, the 
total revenue is more than adequate to offset the cost of reservoir at  the maximum ne t  
benefit size. As  a matter of fact, in three of the four possible cases, the revenue from 
water rights allocation alone is sufficient to build a reservoir a t  the maximum ne t  benefit 
size. 
When the integrated system is operated and managed by a private enterprise, the 
selection of the reservoir size becomes more critical. Without control from the govern- 
ment,  as in the case of monopoly, the p r~f i t~maximiz ing  reservoir owner would tend to 
operate a t  the maximum profit size. The size of reservoir a t  which maximum profit 
occurs is found to be about 7 x 1 0 ~  m3 for both land costs, which is the same for all the 
three cases considered. These results indicate that, unlike the maximum n e t  benefit and 
zero profit reservoir sizes, the maximum profit reservoir size is n o t  sensitive to the cost 
of reservoir. 
Furthermore, these maximum profit sizes are much smaller than the maximum 
n e t  benefit sizes and the nontrival zero profit sizes. I t  can be shown that  this size is 
always less than the size at  which maximum ne t  benefit occurs under the assumptions 
made in this study (i.e., decreasing marginal cost and benefit). A t  this size, the max- 
imum ne t  benefits that can be attained are found to be $ 5 . 9 ~ 1 0 ~  and $5.7x106, com- 
pared to $8.7xlo6 and $ 7 . 6 ~ 1 0 ~  for the maximum net  benefit size, and $8.7xlo6 and 
$ 7 . 5 ~ 1 0 ~  for the zero profit size (with no  prior revenue), for the two different land costs 
(zero and $4324/hectare, respectively). Thus,  the ne t  economic values attainable a t  the 
maximum profit reservoir sizes are substantially lower than those at  the maximum ne t  
benefit o r  zero profit sizes. Therefore, the classical problem of monopolistic curtailment 
of supply (storage, in o u r  case) may pose some problems for the integrated marketable 
water rights and reservoir system when operated as private enterprise. 
When the integrated system is operated as a public utility regulated by the 
authority, better efficiency may be achieved by operating the reservoir a t  the maximum 
profitable size. After  a reasonable rate of return o r  profit margin is determined, the 
reservoir chosen would be less than the zero profit size. However, the resulting net  
benefit may still be very close to the maximum attainable net  benefit, and larger than 
4 2 
that a t  the maximum profit size. 
5.2.2 Practicable Progipams with Specific Release Rules 
The aggregate economic values provided by the three practicable schemes for 
various reservoir sizes are plotted in Figure 5-8. For  the sake of comparison, the curve 
for the optimal integrated system is also plotted on the same graph. 
The program in which release decisions are based o n  target storages (PracP- 
LD R )  achieves quite a bit lower economic values than that of the optimal integrated sys- 
tems ( 8 0  to 99%). The linear decision rule is a relatively crude form of release policy. 
Its performance is expected to be worse than those of the highly sophisticated and care- 
fully managed reservoir operation policies. 
A s  anticipated, the aggregate economic values attained by the program based on 
optimal marginal values of storage and water use ( PracP-MVS&U with optimal release 
parameter values) are found to be higher than those using the linear decision rules for 
all reservoir capacities ( 8 3  to 99%of the maximum). Theoretically, such a policy should 
attain higher economic values if optimal release parameters are used in both policies for 
the following reasons: The release policy as a function of marginal values of storage and 
water use consists of two cyclic parameters for each week, the target storage and margi- 
nal value of storage, whereas the linear decision rule has only the weekly storage param- 
eters. In other words, the PracP-LDR may be viewed as a reduced form of the PracP- 
MVS&U. When (1) the target storages are the same under both policies, ( 2 )  the margi- 
nal values of storage are se t  to a large value-larger than any individual marginal values 
of water use for that week for all the years, and (3)  water in excess of users' demands is 
saved for future use under the linear decision policy, then the two schemes are 
equivalent. 
Under the PracP-MVS&U policy, in which the release parameters are deter- 
mined suboptimally (based on the uncorrelated expected storages and marginal values of 
storage), a much lower economic value is achieved for reservoir capacities u p  to approx- 
imately 5 0 x 1 0 ~  m3, and 'about the same (slightly lower) for larger reservoir sizes, com- 
pared to the target storage scheme using optimal parameter values. 
From these results and discussion, it can be seen that, under  optimal conditions, 
the release policy using marginal values of storage and water use (economic events, 
which may be determined in part from market information) achieves higher economic 
values than the release rule which is simply based on  physical events (such as target 
Annual Aggregate Economic Value, $106 e 
storages). Of course, both policies may be improved by updating the release parameters 
to attain an even higher efficiency. 
In practice, however, more sophisticated and complex policies (such as one 
based on the marginal values of storage and water use, which consists of two parametew 
as compared to the linear decision rule with one parameter) may not definitely achieve 
higher efficiency, depending on how well the release decisions are made (i.e., depending 
on how the release parameters, if any, are determined). More sophisticated release poli- 
cies usually require more information about users' water use benefits and costs in order 
to make better release decisions and, hence, more uncertainties are involved. Quite 
often during the process, misinterpretation of information or uncertainties in the values 
of data may lead to suboptimal reservoir operations. As illustrated by the practicable 
policies here, a selection of suboptimal release parameters may result in even lower 
efficiency than that of a less complicated release policy. 
Under these practicable programs, in which uncertainties in predicting future 
events are also considered, the maximum profit reservoir sizes for different land costs 
and prior water rights distributions, are found to be larger than the maximum profit 
sizes under perfect foresight condition. In other words, the maximum profit reservoir 
sizes under these practicable programs are closer to the maximum net benefit size under 
the OptIS scheme. This result indicates that, under incomplete knowledge situation, 
selecting a reservoir larger than the maximum profit size may be even more desirable. 
5.2.3 Importance of the Two Stagea of the Integrated Marketable Water Rights and 
]Reservoir System 
5.2.3.1 Spot Righb Only 
The annual aggregate economic values derived from the policy of frequent trad- 
ing of rights (Optspot), assuming 21 users invested in capital equipment, are plotted in 
Figure 5-9. (Users 22 through 25 do not make any profit even if there is enough water 
for them at  all times. Hence, it is assumed in this study that these 4 users know this 
fact and do not  even consider planting their plots.) Those of the optimal integrated 
marketable water rights and reservoir system (OptIS) are also displayed in the same 
graph for comparison purposes. 
From the graph, it is shown that under both policies the economic values 
increase as reservoir size increases. The aggregate economic value under the policy of 
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spot trading with no  long-term rights distribution (Optspot) does not  start a t  the max- 
imum value of $ 2 . 6 7 ~ 1 0 ~  at  zero reservoir size. This phenomenon is due to the fact 
that  some of the users make the wrong investment decisions; instead of making a profit 
from irrigating their fields, they are losing money. For  example, a t  zero reservoir size, 
to achieve maximum efficiency, only the first ten users should irrigate their crops. Part 
of the capital costs spent (i.e., total capital cost less benefit from irrigation) for users 11 
through 21 are lost. 
A major reason for these users to make such wrong decisions is the lack of a 
basis for long-term planning under this policy. This does not, however, necessarily 
mean that it is an inefficient policy, as evidenced from the close proximity of the two 
economic value curves. A t  zero reservoir size, the aggregate economic value attained 
under this policy is almost $ 1 ~ 1 0 ~  (36%) less than that of the optimal integrated system, 
which is quite significant. However, as the reservoir size increases, the difference in 
economic gain between the two systems decreases. Furthermore, if existing equipment 
and facilities are available to handle the task of pumping excess water, managing a larger 
harvest, and so on due to better use of water, then capital investment may n o t  be an 
important issue; and under ideal conditions, this policy may also attain the same max- 
imum efficiency as the optimal integrated marketable water rights and reservoir system 
( OptIS). 
5.2.3.2 Long-Term Righta with No Spot llading 
The nonmarket  systems may be viewed as examples of the system with long- 
term rights only. The annual aggregate economic values for various sizes of the reser- 
voir for the 0ptNM.RR-PSUR, 0ptNM.SR-PSUR and 0ptNM.SR-FFR scenarios are 
shown in Figure 5-10. For  comparison purposes, those of the OptIS system are also 
plotted o n  the same graph. Under optimal conditions, trading restrictions lower the 
amount  of economic value captured by the 0ptNM.RR-PSUR and 0ptNM.SR-PSUR 
schemes by about 10 and 40% respectively. 
From the graph, it can be seen that for both definitions of flow rights (FFR and 
PSUR), the two curves are almost identical, which implies that  the efficiencies of the 
systems are insensitive to the two definitions of flow rights. The aggregate economic 
values do no t  increase with reservoir capacities larger than approximately 3 5 x 1 0 ~  m3. 
Because transfer of s h o r t t e r m  rights is not  allowed, the maximum economic values that  
can be captured by the owners of water and storage rights have been attained. The 
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aggregate economic values for the FFR system are only slightly higher than those of the 
PSUR system for reservoir sizes up to about 3 5 x 1 0 ~  m3, beyond which both rights sys- 
tems attain their maximum values of approximately $6.3xlo6. 
These results show that trading restrictions may significantly lower the max- 
imum amount of economic values captured by the system. The importance of the trad- 
ing provision in an integrated marke table water rights and rese rvoir system is thus illus- 
trate d . 
The maximum aggregate economic values attained under the perfect foresight 
scenarios with trading restrictions on storage rights are the lowest of all the programs 
and scenarios examined. The same policies operated under imperfect foresight condi- 
tions would be expected to achieve even lower efficiencies. Because of this, they are not  
simulated in this study. 
5.2.4 Uncertainty Considerations and the EMVU Scenario 
As described in Sections 3 and 4, there are different kinds of events which can- 
not be predicted with absolute certainty in reality. In a marketable water rights and 
reservoir system, these events may generally be classified as one or more of the follow- 
ing: physical (such as climatological and hydrologic events), economic events (such as 
marginal economic values of water use), and trading behavior in the market. 
Market imperfections such as market thinness, and strategic behavior of users 
may be reduced by carefully choosing market regions with a large number of users of 
similar size, insuring proper information disclosure, adopting an appropriate allocation 
procedure, encouraging transfer of rights, minimizing transaction cost, and so on. 
The three practicable programs with specific release rules may be viewed as cases 
in which marginal economic values and demands are known for the week of application, 
but the other physical events (streamflow, rainfall and temperature) for the remaining 
weeks of the season are not  known with absolute certainty. 
The policy used in investigating the significance of spot trading and discussed in 
subsection 5.2.3.1 also dealt with one kind of uncertainty-that of the final economic 
outcomes. 
The maximum annual aggregate economic values for various reservoir sizes 
attained under the EMVU scenario are plotted in Figure 5-11. For comparison pur- 
poses, those of the optimal integrated system (OptIS) as well as the three practicable 
Annual Aggregate Economic Value, $106 
schemes are also exhibited on  the same graph. 
The curve representing the EMVU scenario lies very close to that of the optimal 
policy, which is not  surprising at  all. Since complete knowledge of streamflow, rainfall, 
temperature and demands within seasons is assumed, the only uncertainty is in the indi- 
vidual weekly marginal value of water use. The use of individual weekly expected margi- 
nal values of water use to determine water use decisions is likely to generate very high 
efficiency. 
The three practicable programs achieve lower economic values than the EMVU 
scenario. Although these practicable programs use relatively primitive forms of reser- 
voir operation rules as compared to more sophisticated release policies, from these 
results, it can be seen that in reality uncertainties in predicting future physical events 
(such as streamflow) may affect the efficiency outcome of the integrated system 
significantly if poor predictions are used to determine the releases. 
5.2.5 Summary 
In summary, the increase in annual aggregate economic value and net  benefit 
from the use of a reservoir may be substantial. For  the data base used in this study, a 
maximum increase in aggregate economic value of slightly less than 400% and a more 
than three-fold increase in net  benefit may be achieved. The systems with trading res- 
trictions capture less efficiency than the optimal integrated marketable water rights and 
reservoir system. The practicable programs using linear decision rules and marginal . 
values of storage and water use (which take into account uncertainties in predicting 
future events) attain high economic efficiency, but  there is still room for improvement. 
With a refined release policy, the aggregate economic value attained by the integrated 
system is expected to increase, but  only with carefully determined releases. Under 
these programs, the aggregate economic values, in general, increase with reservoir capa- 
cities and approach the maximum possible aggregate economic values. The two systems 
of separate flow and storage rights with no spot trading, however, attain a much lower 
maximum aggregate economic value. Beyond a certain reservoir size, the aggregate 
economic value simply would not  increase. Restriction of shortrterm transfer of rights 
prevents the capturing of the economic values by other potential users. Hence, it is 
shown that in an integrated marketable water rights and reservoir system, spot trading is 
important in capturing the economic values which otherwise would be lost. 
The maximum ne t  benefit reservoir sizes under the practicable programs, in 
which uncertainties in predicting future events are considered, are all larger than those 
under the optimal integrated system for the two land cost cases, which in turn are larger 
than the zero profit sizes (without prior revenue from water rights allocation). For  the 
case with high land cost, these maximum ne t  benefit sizes cannot be supported by the 
revenue generated from storage rights allocation alone, o r  even by the combined reve- 
nue from the sales of both water rights and storage. This implies that under an imper- 
fect knowledge condition (as  is usually the case), it may be desirable to operate the 
reservoir at  a size as large as possible subject to the nonnegative profit constraint. 
The maximum (optimal) n e t  benefit sizes which are smaller, however, can 
almost always be supported solely by the revenue generated from prior water rights allo- 
cation ( in  this study, three o u t  of four cases), which implies that  in certain cases, free 
distribution of (freely transferable) storage rights may be possible. For  example, distri- 
bution of storage rights among water rights holders may be in proportion to their existr 
ing water rights. However, distribution of storage rights should be carefully planned to 
avoid any distributional and equity problems. Another implication is that, with prior 
water rights allocation, the revenue generated is sufficient to finance the reservoir at  its 
optimal n e t  benefit size; i.e., the optimal net  benefit size may always be selected. 
For the case of pure monopoly of storage by a private enterprise, the owner of 
the reservoir would tend to operate a t  the maximum profit size. This size as well as the 
maximum ne t  benefit that can be attained are very small compared to those based on 
the maximum ne t  benefit o r  zero profit criterion. Thus,  some kind of regulation o r  
control by the government may be desirable. 
Under the policy of frequent spot  trading with no base rights distribution, lower 
efficiency than one with both long- and shortrterm rights may be achieved due to the 
lack of basis for long-term decisions making. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
I t  has been the objective of this study to examine the possibility of integrating 
marketable water rights systems with systems of reservoir design and operation, which 
may be used as an alternative water resources planning and management strategy. A 
number  of integrated systems have been proposed, which could be applied to situations 
with o r  without preexisting water rights allocation. Three kinds of rights may be found 
in an integrated system. They are rights to natural flowing water, rights to outflow from 
the reservoir and rights to reservoir storage. These rights are contingent o n  possession 
of permits, which are issued by the authority (usually the State) o r  o ther  authorized 
entity (such as a private reservoir owner). 
The proposed integrated systems have been examined in detail. Under these 
systems, rights of relatively long duration are initially distributed to potential users 
according to some predetermined procedure (such as through some kind of auction o r  
o ther  appropriate methods). Exchanges of rights, usually of shorter durations, among 
market  participants are allowed and in fact encouraged in the spot market  (even before 
the reservoir is built). From the bids tendered by the prospective users and/or informa- 
tion from other market  transactions (such as the market  price of rights), the authority 
may derive the benefits of water and/or storage which are, a t  least conceptually, closer 
to their true values than traditional engineering benefit estimates. From these benefit 
data as well as the cost of the reservoir, the authority may determine a desirable size of 
reservoir to build. Furthermore, the amount  of water released from the reservoir as 
well as individual water uses may also be determined, in part, from the market  informa- 
tion, which reflects the marginal values of water use and/or storage. 
Inefficiencies under the proposed integrated system, as in many other  practical 
management programs, could be caused by (1) the authority's and/or users' inability to 
predict the future, and ( 2 )  system o r  program restrictions (such as the definition of 
rights, the choice of water release policy, rights allocation procedures, etc.). Note, how- 
ever, that  some of the latter limitations are imposed because of the uncertainties of 
future events. Hence, the distinction between the two causes may no t  be clear-cut. To 
investigate the efficiency performance of the proposed integrated system, a number  of 
programs and scenarios representing different degrees of accuracy in predicting future 
events o r  different rules of program control were devised. These schemes, together 
with other nonmarket programs, some of which serve as high- o r  low-efficiency bench- 
marks, have been applied to a semi-empirical and semi-hypothetical data base on 
5 3 
irrigation water use. 
From the discussion of the theoretical aspects of the proposed integrated system 
as well as the simulation and optimization results of application, the following conclu- 
sions can be drawn: 
1. For the data se t  studied, a large fraction of the possible economic efficiency 
may be attained by the proposed integrated marketable water rights and 
reservoir system. For the three practicable schemes examined in this study, 
the amount  of aggregate economic value captured by the integrated system 
ranges from 70 to 99%of the maximum, depending on the reservoir capa- 
city chosen. 
2.  The integrated marketable water rights and reservoir system (with spot trad- 
ing) achieves higher efficiency than that of nonmarket approaches under 
which shorbterm trading of rights is prohibited. In the absence of uncer- 
tainties in predicting future events, the nonmarket approaches capture a t  
most  from 63 to 92%of the maximum attainable net  benefit. 
3. From the results of the two practicable programs with optimal release 
parameter values, it is shown that reservoir operations based on economic 
information provided by the market may achieve higher economic value 
than if such data are not  available and used. 
4. If the reservoir is owned and operated by a private enterprise, the system 
may need supervision from the government. Otherwise, the profib 
maximizing behavior of the owner may lead to the undersizing of the reser- 
voir and substantially lower economic efficiency under the monopolistic 
environment. 
5. There is no major difficulty in implementing most  of the proposed 
integrated systems, even under situations with preexistent water rights allo- 
cations. The amount of additional work required, if any, does not  seem to 
be significant when compared to more traditional means of water rights and 
reservoir management. 
These conclusions are derived largely from the case study using economic data 
on irrigation return for a portion of the Little Wabash Basin of Illinois. A number  of 
assumptions, among which are decreasing marginal benefit and reservoir cost functions, 
have been made during the analysis. It  is expected that similar results may obtain for 
similar conditions. Application of the proposed o r  similar techniques to situations 
involving more diversified water uses, and hence more heterogeneity in the individual 
revenue generating functions, is a potential subject for future study. Another area of 
interest is to develop better methods for determining the proper releases from the reser- 
vo ir. 
Overall, this study has demonstrated that a markebbxed  approach to reservoir 
planning and water allocation/reallocation may be quite efficient in managing o u r  water 
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